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ABSTRACT 
 
The present paper studies the impact of the Boston bombings on the main international stock 
markets, comparing it with that of previous terrorist attacks (9/11, 3/11 and 7/7). In order to 
properly embed our analysis in the theoretical framework, first we present an overview of 
earlier studies centered on the repercussion of terrorism on financial markets. The empirical 
part consists in measuring whether the return of the ,main index of New York stock Markets 
resulting from the attacks differ statistically regarding the variations of the 30 trading days 
before the attack. In addition, we also study the intraday data, contrasting the direct impact of 
news spread through social media affected the index of the New York stock market. Finally we 
also take into consideration the repercussion of the fake tweet about an alleged terrorist attack 
on the White House hurting president Obama and compare its impact with that of the Boston 
bombing. The analysis of the results offers some interesting interpretative hypotheses involving 
an evolution in the behavior of the stock markets in response to the terrorist attacks. 
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RESUMEN 
 
El presente documento estudia el impacto de los atentados de Boston sobre los principales 
mercados financieros internacionales, comparándolo con el de sucesos terroristas anteriores 
(11-S, 11-M y 7-J). A fin de enmarcar nuestro análisis en un marco teórico adecuado, 
revisamos, en primer lugar, aquellos otros trabajos que han estudiado la repercusión de los 
ataques terroristas sobre los mercados de valores. La parte empírica consiste en medir si la 
variación de los principales valores de la bolsa de Nueva York difiere de forma 
estadísticamente significativa de la de las treinta sesiones anteriores a los ataques. A su vez, 
estudiamos los datos intradía, contrastando el impacto directo de las noticias que fueron 
difundidas por medio de las redes sociales, también comparamos el fenómeno con el impacto 
del falso tweet anunciando un supuesto atentado contra la Casa Blanca en el que resultó herido 
el presidente Obama.  
Del análisis de los resultados podemos avanzar algunas hipótesis interpretativas interesantes 
que involucran una evolución en el comportamiento de los mercados de valores en respuesta a 
los atentados terroristas. 
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INTRODUCTION
In the morning of that picturesque Boston spring day, with blue skies, the sun shining, 
and a slight spring breeze, no one could have predicted how different the city’s mood 
would change just a few hours later. As every year, on the third Monday of April, the 
state of Massachusetts (along with Wisconsin and Maine) celebrated Patriots’ Day, 
commemorating the anniversary of the first battles of the American Revolution.1 Behind 
the Fourth of July, it is essentially the most patriotic holiday in America, hence its 
name. At the same time, for Bostonians the day symbolizes the unofficial beginning of 
spring — even though spring officially begins three weeks before. Added to that, it is 
also the day of the Boston Marathon, the oldest and most popular marathon in the 
United States. People come from all parts of the country and the world to take part in 
the great tradition of the Marathon and to see the city of Boston. And along with the 
participants, thousands of people line the streets to cheer on their friends, family, and 
other runners, as well as to take part in the Patriots’ Day festivities.  
* * * 
However, on April 15, 2013, a pair of terrorists decided to take this staple in 
Massachusetts tradition and turn it into nightmare. At approximately 2:50 p.m. (around 
4 hours and 15 minutes into the race) a large explosion went off near the finish line on 
Boylston Street, followed by another, seconds later on that very street.2 Runners and 
spectators ran in terror and shock. Those who were able made their way to the nearest 
hospital to begin donating blood, including runners who had just finished the race. At 
this point the extent of the attack was not known, thus spreading fear and worry in the 
hearts of Bostonians and people all over the world. 
The following hours were incredibly hectic in the city: other explosive devices were 
being reported to be found in the surrounding areas, a third explosion — which later 
turned out to be unrelated to the attack — went off at the JFK Library, and the cellphone 
services were inhibited in order to avoid the use of another detonation device. Suddenly, 
the attack brought back memories of 9/11 and people began to question if this was an 
Al-Qaeda related attack, evoking fears that the citizens of the U.S. had been able to 
overcome. 
1
 The Battles of Concord and Lexington which occurred on April 19, 1775. It is a day to look back on the 
success and the freedom the United States gained from their fight with the British, which led to the 
creation of the United States we know today. 
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 Sporting events have been a common place for terrorist attacks to occur. With thousands of people 
watching and being such a popular escape from every-day life, terrorist have used them in order to send 
their message. Prominent attacks on sporting events include: the 1972 Munich Olympics (where members 
of the Palestinian organization Black September held members of the Israeli national team hostage, 
eventually killing 11 athletes and coaches, along with one German police officer); the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics bombing (carried out by Eric Rudolph who killed 2 and injured another 100-plus people with 
his bomb); the car bomb detonated by ETA on May 1, 2002 at Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid before Real 
Madrid’s semi-final Champions League game against Barcelona; the reschedule of the Paris-Dakar Rally 
in 2008 —for the first time after 30 years— due to the threat of an Al Qaeda attack (causing a major 
economic loss); and the suicide bomber attack, on April 8, 2006, of the Sinhala and Tamil New Year 
Marathon in Sri Lanka (killing 15 and injuring another 90 people). For a more detailed analysis regarding 
the relation between sports and terrorism, see, among others, Giulianotti and Klauser (2012) and Hassan 
(2012).  
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The fright and uncertainty caused by the attack was not just injected into the general 
public, but also into the stock markets. This can be seen by the 1.97 per cent point drop 
that occurred in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the that day — of which, more 
specifically, 120 points or 0.82 per cent were due to the attacks —, as well as on the 
losses in the European and Japanese indices. While there are probably other factors that 
caused these point losses, it is undoubtable that the fear and questions regarding the 
perpetrators of the attack and what would follow (Was it Al-Qaeda? Will there be 
another attack? If so when?) caused uncertainty and volatility in the world stock 
markets (for a detailed time-line of the events, see table 1). 
What makes this recent attack particularly interesting was not just how it initially 
reacted to the news, but also how it was affected by the real time information given by 
social media websites like Twitter. In recent terrorist attacks like 9/11 or the Madrid 
Train Bombings (3/11) or the London Bombings (7/7), social media was nowhere near 
as prominent in society as it is today. And because of this, in the past the stock markets 
were blind to emerging details about the attacks for some time. However now, with the 
number of people using social media websites, the Boston Police Department utilized 
Twitter to communicate to the public, including the stock markets, real time details of 
the attack. This includes information regarding the number of injuries and deaths, and 
who may or may not have committed the crime. As mentioned in a previous study about 
the Madrid March 11 attacks, “there were two factors which had a significant influence 
on [market movements]: the number of victims — the only objective measurement 
available to investors when quantifying the magnitude of the attacks — and who was 
being accused of perpetrating them” (Baumert, 2009:125-126). With that information 
now readily available to the general public and the stock markets through the use of 
social media, it can be seen when drops occur in the markets and what news 
corresponds with those decreases, a study previously only applied to the case of the 
Madrid bombings (Baumert, 2009). Thus, this paper will examine both the overall effect 
that the Boston bombings had on the international markets and, more specifically, the 
way in which the real time flow of information through forums like social media was 
reflected in the (intraday data) index of the New York Stock Exchange. 
HOW STOCK MARKETS REACT TO TERRORIST ATTACKS 
Financial markets are the first — after a period of initial shock, when there is a 
predominance of exaggerated reactions as a result of uncertainty (Chen and Siems 
2004:39) — to absorb and transform the news of a terrorist attack — or any similar 
“disastrous” event3 — into economic information, efficiently incorporating it into share 
prices, so that these reflect almost immediately the expectations as to future 
performances of these shares (Johnston and Nedelescu 2005: 4).4 
3
 From an economic viewpoint, terrorist attacks are not different from other “extreme events” (such as 
natural or similar catastrophes), characterised by giving rise to non-linear responses, low likelihood, grave 
consequences and high probability of triggering systemic reactions which can lead to heavy losses. See 
for this, Richardson, Gordon and Moore (2005:1) and Chesney et al. (2011:267). 
4
 Thus, stock markets act as a sort of seismograph which not only reflects the reaction to terrorist attacks, 
but may even be used to detect a rise in the risk of an attack perceived by investors. For example, in April 
2007, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published an article according to which the German Insurance 
Company “Extremus” (which is specialised in terrorism-insurances) had experienced an increase in the 
insurance contracts signed, weeks before the German Government announced a raise in the terrorist-threat 
level. 
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Table 1: Boston Bombings: timeline of the events 
Source: own elaboration from different online media. 
To carry out this type of analysis we take as a base the principle of stock market 
efficiency (Fama et al. 1969; Fama 1970 and 1991), through which as long as liquidity 
is ensured, the incorporation of information to share prices — that is, the transformation 
of a news item into quantifiable economic information — takes place immediately. 
From this is derived, also, that share prices reflect at all times the existing information, 
so that a reaction only occurs in the face of fresh news (Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2003:122). 
April 15, 2013 
2:50 p.m.: An explosion goes off near the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon on Boylston Street, followed 
by another explosion seconds later about 1500 yards away on the same street. 
2:57 p.m.: Twitter of Boston Globe reports witnesses hearing “two loud booms” near the finish line. 
3:14 p.m.: First video of the scene following the explosion emerges. 
3:30 p.m.: Reports and images from the scene begin to circulate on social media, including some graphic photos. 
3:55 p.m.: Boston Police Department detonate an object near Copley Square in a controlled explosion. 
4:02 p.m.: First numbers of dead and injuries, reporting 2 dead and 14 injured. 
4:12 p.m.: Police respond to third explosion at the JFK Library, located in Dorchester MA. 
4:50 p.m.: Police department confirms the two explosions that occurred earlier in the day with Deval Patrick, and 
also confirm the third explosion and fire which they suspect is related. 
5:01 p.m.: Cellphone service in Boston is shut off to prevent any further detonation device setting off another 
possible explosion. 
5:06 p.m. Spokesman for the library claims the third incident could have just been a “mechanical room fire” - no 
injuries in the incident. 
6:12 p.m.: President Obama addresses the nation. 
8:49 p.m.: Governor Deval Patrick, in a press conference, says the FBI has taken over the investigation and it is 
confirmed that there are three deaths and at least 100 injured. 
April 16, 2013 
-Still no claim of responsibility for the attacks. 
-It is determined that the bombs were created from kitchen pressure cookers packed with explosives, nails and 
ball bearings - hidden in backpacks, which were left on the ground. 
-Pressure cooker bombs are difficult to trace which makes it hard to pin point an origin or suspect, as well as 
these being amateur devices (Al-Qaeda is becoming a less likely suspect with this news). 
-Photo of Jeff Bauman Jr., with both his legs blown off from the knee, spreads virally. 
April 17, 2013 
-Photos of suspicious characters in the crowds at the finish line emerge in the news and online. 
-Boston remains under a heavy security presence - virtually in lockdown. 
April 18, 2013 
5:10 p.m.: Photos and videos of Suspect No. 1 and No. 2 are released to the public - both men are considered 
“armed and dangerous” - they are later identified as Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev (26 and 19 respectively). 
.
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Specifically, a terrorist attack implies an important rise in uncertainty among financial 
agents along with a perception of greater risk, as, on the one hand, the vulnerability of 
the system becomes evident — as further attacks cannot be ruled out — and, on the 
other, when the direct and indirect costs resulting from them are taken into 
consideration.5 These costs, depending upon the magnitude and intensity of the attacks, 
could lead to a slowdown in the general growth of the economy. This takes shape in the 
higher volatility of stocks and an increase in risk premiums. Consequently, investors 
will tend to re-organise their portfolios, getting rid of the higher-risk shares in favour of 
assets with similar liquidity but greater security, such as, for example, government 
bonds with short-term maturity dates or similar (Saxton 2002:2). 
This reaction takes place almost immediately and reflects the perception of short-term 
costs, and normally the markets will return to the previous situation in a relatively short 
time. Normally, for this negative outlook to become medium-term there will have to be 
a series of attacks or, at least, the financial agents will believe that this is probably to 
happen. In other words, the impact of single terrorist events on stock markets is 
unnoticeable in the long term. Markets get used to terrorist actions and rapidly recover 
from their effects. Uncertainty is thus transferred to the derivatives market, which by 
means of the risk premium assesses long-term instability. 
In this sense, share prices and the evolution of stock market indexes are a good source 
of information about the economic impact of terrorism (Campbell et al. 1997), since 
they reflect both companies’ profit expectations and the likelihood seen by investors as 
to these being achieved. According to Frey et al. (2004:13), terrorist attacks influence 
both. 
a) Profit expectations are reduced due to the destruction of physical and
intangible capital, but also when greater security measures increased production 
and transaction costs, and if consumers’ fears reduce demand (as in the case of 
airlines following 11-S). 
b) The risk premium increases when terrorism involves greater uncertainty about
the prospects for firms in the market. 
Nonetheless, there exist some factors which limit the extent of this type of study. Thus, 
in the first place, the fall in stock market values does not measure a direct cost, in the 
sense of a direct loss, since for the investor the latter would depend upon the acquisition 
price, and it is — at least hypothetically — possible that, in spite of a significant fall in 
a share price after an attack, it could still be sold at a profit (albeit lower than what 
would have been obtained if the sale had been made the day before the attacks). As a 
result, this loss must not be treated as a real cost, since for that purpose it would be 
necessary for (a) the loss to have been realized and (b) to know the buying price.  
However, it is a hypothetical cost, since the value of investors’ portfolios is adversely 
affected as a result of the decapitalisation of the firms represented in them. This loss — 
which is reversible in principle (Chen and Siems 2004:349) — can, nevertheless be 
5
 As Martínez Cañete and Pérez-Soba (2002: 170), point out, uncertainty generated by the 3/11 attacks 
raised the risk premium of the market and thus the performance needed by investors to keep the shares in 
their portfolios. Thus a survey in October 2001 showed that extra profitability demanded by investors in 
order to acquire fixed interest stock had risen to 4 per cent, against 3 per cent in previous months 
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converted into a real one when the investor finds himself obliged to sell, for example, 
when he was trading with derivative futures. In any case, firms’ decapitalisation is 
temporary, so another fundamental element to take into account would be the recovery 
period of the shares, which, in turn, depends on the general trend of the markets at the 
time of the attacks.  
Another relevant factor — and one often ignored — is that share quotations already 
include in themselves certain risks, among which, depending on different factors, is a 
certain likelihood of a terrorist attack taking place. Likewise, we must point out one 
more limitation, namely, the difficulty of discriminating between those share price 
movements caused specifically by attacks, and the remaining factors — unrelated to or 
only indirectly linked to this fact — which may influence the investors’ perception and 
actions (Frey et al. 2004:13-14), so this type of study is only valid in the very short 
term. 
A final aspect to be taken into account is the need to avoid the error of accounting for 
the same cost twice, for example, including losses from a particular sector (tourism, 
airlines, etc.) on a par with stock market decapitalisation of these very same sectors, 
since the latter is merely the advance discount of these losses by investors (Navarro and 
Spencer 2001:23). 
Nonetheless, faced with the question as to whether share prices are an adequate 
measurement of the cost of attacks, we may conclude that, as long as the previous 
reservations are borne in mind, they “may be the best single measure of the losses to the 
owners of capital linked to the physical damage, the expected decline in corporate 
profits associated with macroeconomic instability and — most elusive— the greater risk 
premium investors now attach to the ownership of equity” (ibidem). 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Although nearly all financial bodies and institutions regularly analyse stock market’s 
reaction to particular types of events (political, economic, social, environmental or 
demographic), it was only after the attacks of 9/11 that this type of research — focused 
particularly on the repercussion of terrorism on stock markets — became more 
widespread academically, thus reacting to a growing demand for studies referring to the 
economic consequences of terrorism (Drakos 2004:445; Enders and Sandler 2006:2, 
Kollias et al., 2011:532). This being said, the literature on the subject issue is still 
limited (Karolyi and Martel, 2010:285, Chesney et al., 2011:253). 
One of the earliest studies of this kind was published by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003), who analysed the impact of ETA terrorism on share prices of firms considered 
to be Basque.6 To this purpose they compared the evolution of a hypothetical portfolio 
of 14 Basque shares, compared to another one made-up of 59 shares from the rest of 
Spain, during the 1998-1999 “truce” and throughout the period immediately after it. If 
Basque terrorism were seen as a factor of negative impact on that region’s economy, the 
announcement of the truce would have had to be of positive impact on the shares of 
6
 Given that large firms — and we can consider quoted firms as such —, have both “Basque” and “non-
Basque” capital, it is more practical to make a discrimination between firms in the sample on the basis of 
whether they are perceived and considered as Basque, normally starting with the name. 
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Basque companies, whereas the ending of the same truce should have had a negative 
impact. In fact, the findings obtained show that Basque shares performed very much 
better than non-Basque ones during the ceasefire period. In complementary fashion the 
authors estimate the coefficients of dummy variables which respectively measure the 
impact of the 22 days when bad news was prevalent and the 66 sessions with good 
news. In the case of Basque firms, the findings show a statistically significant and 
negative impact in the former case and a positive one in the latter. In the case of 
companies from the rest of the national territory, neither of the two dummies is 
statistically significant, thus proving the lesser impact of Basque terrorism beyond that 
Autonomous Community. 
One of the most wide-ranging studies carried out so far, is that by Chen and Siems 
(2004), who analysed stock market reaction to fourteen terrorist and military attacks, 
from the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 to the 9/11 attacks.7 The authors conclude that 
both terrorist attacks and military actions have a significant and almost immediate 
impact on world stock markets, albeit this impact may differ in intensity and duration. 
However, these effects are usually short-term ones, and the findings suggest that in 
recent times stock markets have been more resistant and better able to absorb them. One 
factor with a positive influence in this respect is the existence of a strong banking and 
financial sector, which enables markets to recover their stability rapidly. This is 
reinforced by close international communication and cooperation (Chen and Siems 
2004:363-365).  
Another interesting work is the one made by Eldor and Melnick (2004), who analysed 
the Israeli stock and exchange market reaction to terrorist attacks suffered by the 
population of this country between 1990 and 2003, and which has had important effects 
on the economic development of the State of Israel. According to a simulation carried 
out by these authors, — in which they take as a reference the S&P500 — if there had 
been no terrorist attacks in Israel between 2000 and 2003, the main stock exchange 
index in Tel Aviv, the TA100, would have evolved 30 per cent better than the real 
figure. The aim of the study by Eldor and Melnick is important for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is one of the few cases in which the terrorist phenomenon takes the form of a 
series of relatively continual attacks, so it is possible to analyse their impact, not just in 
terms of the type of, but also how intense and frequent they were. In this way the above-
mentioned hypothesis can be checked, and according to this the repercussion of the 
attacks on stock markets is only important when the attacks are persistent over time.8 
7
 We consider as not very successful the decision to analyse jointly terrorist attacks and military events, 
despite being aware that in the literature definitions of terrorism that allow the latter to be included are to 
be found (the criterion used in choosing the events — e.g., two Gulf wars are absent . — is not clear and 
the authors themselves admit to a certain bias in their selection). But even beyond definitions the question 
is not a vain one, since, for example, it implies that when designing the econometric model a period must 
be taken into account beginning between five and ten days prior to the effect in question really taking 
place — in which the ultimatum is given, formal declaration of war, etc. — and in which markets 
speculate on the likelihood of military conflict really happening. On the other hand, terrorist attacks are 
generally characterised precisely by not being predictable, except when the execution of a kidnapped is 
announced. If this previous situation arises, in which markets are already speculating on the likelihood of 
an event taking place, normally this information is progressively taken on board, so that the impact, as 
measured after the event, presents a value a long way short of reality. In accordance with the work by 
Cutler et al. (1989), this undervaluation could be as much as fifty per cent of the total impact.  
8
 We do not give a detailed description here of other works analysing the impact of other types of 
phenomena, of a non-terrorist nature, despite, as we have already mentioned previously, the fact that  the 
literature frequently jointly analyses terrorist attacks and attacks classifiable, in accordance with 
8
Therefore, the authors conclude that the impact of a terrorist attack does not depend 
primarily on its magnitude, but rather on its intensity. With regard to the second 
question, the authors affirm that markets are efficient in incorporating the information 
about the attacks, not finding any evidence about them having become desensitised over 
time.  
For their part, Drakos (2004), Carter and Simkins (2004) and Choudhry (2005), have 
analysed the extent to which the 9/11 attacks changed the risk — as measured by the 
beta coefficient — of a share’s volatility with regard to the general or sectoral index 
corresponding to each share. For this purpose the latter of these studies compared the 
betas in the period prior and subsequent to the attacks of 9/11 for a total of twenty US 
firms of varying sizes, geographical location and sectors. The findings obtained indicate 
a widely differing impact, depending upon the characteristics of each firm. Fifteen of 
the twenty firms saw their betas rise after the attacks, although in some cases the 
changes were marginal. Likewise, share volatility increased in half of the firms.  
On the other hand, Drakos’ (2004) work centres attention on just one sector, analysing 
beta alterations in the period following 9/11 as shown by thirteen US and non-US 
airlines. After 9/11 the share quotations of these companies showed an average fall of 
30 per cent, whereas the American ones did so by an average 53 per cent. An important 
difference between the American companies and the rest can also be seen in the number 
of sessions required for pre 9/11 levels to be regained. The authors conclude that the 
risk associated with airline shares was drastically increased after 9/11. In all cases the 
betas showed a marked increase, and in nine of the thirteen companies studied these 
differences were statistically significant. When risk is broken down into its two main 
components — systematic and specific risk — the former almost doubles (in terms of 
beta) after the attacks, thus significantly increasing its relative importance.  
Unlike the previous two, the article by Carter and Simkins (2004) goes a step further, by 
analysing not just the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the share prices of the airlines, but 
also whether investors’ reaction was rational in the face of these prices. Just as occurred 
in the above-mentioned study, these authors detect a clearly negative market reaction, 
although it registered differing intensities for different airlines. Proof that those airlines 
with the highest capital reserves were less affected than the rest, enables them to 
conclude that investor reaction was rationally differentiated.9  
As the final aspect, it is worth pointing out that Hon, Strauss and Young (2004), after 
analysing the reaction of the world’s financial markets in the wake of 9/11, prove that a 
international law, as military. This does not prevent these studies being relevant from the viewpoint of the 
analysis method used. Thus, Rigobon and Sacks (2005) study the reaction of financial markets in the 
months prior to the start of the Second World War, that is, in the face of a risk of it happening, and they 
make use of a comparison based on heteroscedasticity. However, this type of analysis is founded on the 
assumption of informative ceteris paribus which is very difficult to sustain if the analysis covers more 
than a few days. Nonetheless, the findings obtained coincide with those of Amihud and Wohl (2004) and 
Leigh et al. (2004), who on the other hand, measure expectations of war and, once that is included of 
when it will end, by means of the betting tax — the equivalent of a Saddam Hussein contract — of an 
Irish online betting shop. What is not clear is whether the expectations harboured by the betters are the 
same as those of financial agents.  
9
 The findings of this study coincide with those of Drakos (2004), since the increase in a share’s 
systematic risk detected by the latter thus implies knowledge of capital costs and, consequently, a 
reduction in the performance rate and by Baumert (2009) who studies the reaction of the Spanish Stock 
Exchange after 3/11. 
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“contagion effect” took place — an increase in the correlation between them —, a result 
both of their strong interconnection, and of the practically simultaneous news flow. This 
fact has an important consequence, since it would imply that it is almost impossible to 
avoid the repercussions of large-scale terrorist attacks by means of the international 
portfolio diversification.10 Nevertheless, more recent studies (Chesney et al., 2011:262-
265), suggest that there indeed are several diversification strategies towards minimizing 
terrorist risk, mainly splitting the portfolio into two sort of assets: those which are likely 
to react to terrorist attacks and those which react to a lesser extent (mainly US 
Government bonds and stocks related to aero/defense and pharma biotech).11 
Zussman and Zussman (2006) use stock market data to evaluate the perceived 
effectiveness of “selective assassinations” as counterterrorist measure applied by the 
Israeli government. Working with data from Tel Aviv 25 stock market and for the time 
period of 136 trading days during which the counterterrorist measure was applied by 
Israeli Forces, the authors conclude, that the index reacts in a quite differentiated way: 
assassination attempts targeting political leaders have a negative effect on the stock 
market while assassinations of military leaders (except for Fatah ones) have a positive 
effect. 
Arin, Ceferri and Spagnolo (2008) present in their article interesting results regarding 
the repercussion of terrorist events on stock markets working with data from six 
different countries (Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and UK) considering not 
only on stock markets but also volatility. They conclude that the impact of this sort of 
event is significantly larger in emerging markets. 
The work by Baumert (2009), taking advantage of the fact that the Madrid bombings 
(3/11) were one of the rare cases in which the Stock Exchange of the attacked country 
continued working normally and that during that day the information spread by news 
media nearly exclusively referred to the attack, used intraday data to contrast which 
specific type of news affected — and in which direction — the Spanish Stock Market. 
The study showed that the there were two main sort of news which significantly 
impacted the market: the size of the attack (in terms of the number of death and injured 
officially announced over the day) and the alleged perpetrators (ETA vs. Al-Qaeda). In 
addition, it the intraday information also confirms that, despite the overreaction, 
investors tend to act rationally, as the stocks which presented heavier losses were those 
more directly affected by the attack. 
Studying the — up to now somehow neglected — Pakistani financial market’s reaction 
to terrorist activities between 2006 and 2008, Gul et al. (2010) illustrate a significant 
negative impact of terrorist events on the Karachi Stock Exchange Index (KSEI), 
although they do not achieve any significant results on other related variables. Also, 
their model shows some difficulties in separating terrorist events from other influencing 
factors.  
10
 In this same line, Chuliá et al. (2007) studying the volatility transmission between the US and Eurozone 
stock markets, have shown that this transmission is actually bidirectional and asymmetric. 
11 Of course investment banks have developed in the meantime and offer now “terrorist-free-investment 
funds”. For an assessment of terrorism-related investment strategies, see Karolyi (2008) and Karolyi and 
Martell (2010). 
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Brounen and Derwall (2010), have compared the price reactions of the major stock 
markets to terrorist events, concluding that they might be considered “mildly negative” 
— except for the case of 9/11 which showed en important and longer lasting 
repercussion —, although their impact proves to be still larger than those of comparable 
natural disasters such as earthquakes. 
For their part, the study by Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2010), comparing the reaction of 
the FTSE 100 Index after the events of 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 showed that these attacks 
significantly shifted the downwards investor’s expectations, and drastically increased 
stock market uncertainty (thus confirming the previous studies by Burch et al., 2003 and 
Glaser and Weber, 2005 who in the aftermaths of 9/11 detected a negative move in 
investors sentiment). In addition, the authors also demonstrate that the implied 
probability density functions became more negatively skewed on the days of the 
terrorist attacks, proving that investors considered higher probabilities for further sharp 
downward movements in the FTSE index, although they were only of short duration. 
The same set of attacks (9/11, 3/11 and 7/7) is studied by Baumert (2010) who analyzes 
the effect of those terrorist events on the major US, European and Japanese Stock 
Indices, proving that over the time period studied, both the size of the impact and its 
duration has diminished, a fact that allows for two (complementary) explanations: (a) 
Investors have overcome their initial “overreaction” of 9/11 and have learned to more 
objectively measure the real economic repercussion of a terrorist attack and (b) 
Investors have become more accustomed to the terrorist threat, incorporating the 
associated risk more systematically into share prices.  
In contrast, a broader set of terrorist events (75 attacks between 1995 and 2002) is used 
by Karolyi and Martell (2010), who study the impact on the publicly traded firms 
directly targeted, thus being more representative of the types of risk that individual 
firms face in dealing with terrorism.12 The results obtained by the authors allows to 
quantify this statistically significant impact in a mean loss of -0.83 per cent on the day 
of the attack (which corresponds to a market de-capitalization of around $401 million). 
They authors also show that the overall impact of terrorist attacks is major in higher 
developed and more democratic countries — this somehow contradicting the results by 
Gul et al. (2010), and results more important in the case of human capital losses than 
the case of physical losses. 
Kollias et al. (2011), using event study methodology and GARCH family models, study 
the impact of the Madrid and of the London bombings on equity sectors. Significant 
negative abnormal returns are widespread across the majority of sectors in the Spanish 
markets but not so in the case of London. Also the time of recovery is much faster in the 
latter case (the impact and volatility being in any case transitory), thus all results 
confirm those previously presented by Baumert (2010). 
Finally, a similar approach is applied by Chesney et al. (2011) who combine a GARCH 
and Extreme Value Theory (VET) approach, to 25 countries and a eleven year timespan. 
The authors conclude that approximately two-thirds of the terrorist attacks considered 
lead to a significant negative impact on at least one stock market (the Swiss market 
being the most sensitive and the US American one —exception made of 9/11— the 
12
 Broadly speaking, terrorist attacks on firms result in two sort of costs: tangible assets (properties, 
plants, equipment) and intangible assets (like human capital resources). 
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least sensitive one. Also, their study shows the most sensitive sectors are insurance and 
airlines, while the least sensitive one is banking. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The stock market reaction to the Boston bombing in comparison with 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 
Analyzing the reaction of the stock markets represents a particularly useful instrument 
when measuring the intensity and duration of the economic impact of a terrorist attack 
With this aim, in the present section we try to quantify the depth and duration of the 
Boston bombings impact on the main international financial markets. When making this 
analysis it is necessary in turn to take into consideration the political measures adopted 
in the wake of each attack by the authorities concerned to offset these same effects. As 
mentioned by Brück and Wickström (2004:295), the latter depend, as well as on the 
specific type of attack and the multiplier effect, on each market’s absorption capacity, as 
well as the financial policies adopted in each case. As Baumert (2010) conveniently 
showed, the magnitude of the attacks, measured by the cost of their organisation and 
execution, diminished exponentially from 9/11, over 3/11 to 7/7.  
Obviously, also, the economic costs caused by the attacks, both in absolute and relative 
terms, have fallen over time. Thus, the direct economic impact of 9/11 can be quantified 
at $47,000 million, — equivalent to 0.46 per cent of GDP —, compared to the 
€211,584,762 estimated for 3/11 — equivalent to 0.03 per cent of GDP — and the 
£44,207,254 we have previously estimated for 7/7 (about 0.02 per cent of national 
GDP), no estimation yet being available for the case of the Boston bombings.13 We can 
conclude, therefore, that the magnitude of the attacks has diminished, although to a 
greater extent from the viewpoint of execution and organization costs which from the 
economic impact stemming from them, are reflected in the fact that the ratio between 
the two magnitudes presents a noticeably more moderate decline. 
This smaller “size” of the attacks also implies a lesser impact on financial markets — in 
terms both of their depth (magnitude) and duration (intensity) — which records the 
maximum losses suffered by the main stock exchange index of the country affected 
(Dow Jones, Ibex35 and FTSE) before they recovered to the values obtained before the 
event in question, and the number of sessions required for them to do so. Thus, after 
9/11, the maximum loss suffered by the Dow was -14.3 per cent, and 44 sessions were 
needed (including five in which the New York exchange was closed) to reach the levels 
of September 10. The Ibex35, however, took no more than 20 sessions to recover (with 
a maximum loss of -7.15 per cent). Moreover, the impact of the London attacks lasted 
just one session (-1.35 per cent), as occurred with the Boston bombing (-1.79 per cent, 
although only roughly the half of it due to the explosions at the finishing line of the 
Marathon). Anyhow, the daily loss of the Dow Jones on the days of the attack still was 
the worst since November 7, 2012, and those of the S&P500 and of the Nasdaq even 
were the worst since November 2011. 
Nonetheless, the maximum loss is only valid as an approximate measurement of the 
repercussion of the attacks on the stock markets, given that it does not take into account 
the influence of other factors — particularly the general market trend within which the 
13
 Although from the information available it might be assumed that the costs of organizing and 
perpetrating the attack might have been relatively small.  
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attacks occurred — so it is necessary to quantify the impact of the attacks by 
considering these elements simultaneously. 
For this purpose, we carry out an analysis similar to the one presented by Chen and 
Siems (2004) in which a comparison is made of the “abnormal” variations experienced 
by stock market quotations after a terrorist attack, with regard to the “normal” one, 
considering as such the average of the thirty days prior to the event, in accordance with 
the following functions:  
ititi RRA −= ,, (1) 
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,30
1
t
tii RR (2) 
Where R designates the percentual variation observed at the close of day t with regard 
to the value at the close of the previous day (t-1) and A designates the abnormal 
variation experienced by the stock exchange index in question as a consequence of the 
attack, referring to the average variation R, calculated according to the function (2). The 
values thus obtained to the stock markets of Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Paris, Milan, 
New York and Tokyo and the terrorist events of 9/11, 3/11, 7/7 and 4/15, have been 
compared following the methodology originally presented by Brown and Warner 
(1985). 
Table 2: Statistical analysis of the impact of major terrorist attacks on stock markets 
Abnormal returns on the day of the attacks. In brackets the t-value. 
* = statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.
**= statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
***= statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
As can be seen in table 2, our results demonstrate that the reaction after each attack has 
diminished continuously (in those cases where it was statistically significant), with the 
exception of the Dow Jones, which — for obvious reasons — reacted again more 
heavily to the Boston bombings that it had done to the London ones. Anyhow, it should 
be noted that after 7/7 three cases (Milan, New York and Tokyo) did not result 
significant. At least in the case of New York, this might be explained by the less 
Index 
New York 
bombings 
(9/11) 
Madrid 
bombings 
(3/11) 
London 
bombings 
(7/7) 
Boston 
bombings 
(4/15) 
DAX30 -6.44*** (4.51) 
-3.46*** 
(3.66) 
-1.85*** 
(3.05) 
-0.39*** 
(2.18) 
FTSE100 -3.01*** (3.11) 
-2.2*** 
(3.69) 
-1.36*** 
(3.15) 
-0.61*** 
(4.50) 
IBEX35 -4.45*** (3.44) 
-2.18*** 
(3.08) 
-1.91*** 
(3.71) 
-0.82*** 
(2.92) 
CAC40 -7.39*** (7.37) 
-2.97*** 
(4.12) 
-1.39*** 
(2.48) 
-0.67*** 
(3.45) 
MIB30 -7.79*** (6.76) 
-2.22*** 
(4.21) 
-0.62 
(0.95) 
-0.61*** 
(2.28) 
DOWJONES -7.13*** (7.10) 
-1.67*** 
(3.07) 
0.31 
(0.61) 
-0.86*** 
(3.06) 
NIKKEI225 -6.63*** (3.64) 
-1.19* 
(1.36) 
-0.12 
(0.51) 
-0,41*** 
(3.06) 
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sensitiveness of US financial markets to terrorist attacks except for when they are 
committed on their own soil (Chesney et al., 2011). Nevertheless, in general terms, it is 
not possible to detect any desensitisation of the markets, as already stated by Eldor and 
Melnick(2004).  
Second, it can be observed, that the reaction of the stock markets differed less than in 
any of the other previous attacks, thus presenting a reduction of the spread between 
them (see graph 2). This might indicate both a greater correlation among markets — a 
hypothesis that would fit the results presented by Hon, Strauss and Young (2004) — but 
also a more precise and rational differentiated evaluation of the economic consequences 
of an attack (Carter and Simkins, 2004). 
Focusing our attention on the Boston bombing, it can be stated that they had a 
significant, negative impact on all mayor stock markets analysed: DAX30 (-0.39%), 
FTSE100 (-0.61%), IBEX35 (-0.82), CAC40 (-0.67), MIB30 (-0.61), DOWJONES (-
0.81) and NIKKEI (-0.41). Nonetheless, albeit their significance, they were all relatively 
small or, to use the term employed by Brounen and Derwall (2010), “mildly 
negative”.14 However, in should be bore in mind, that our selection of markets is biased 
towards the developed countries which, according to Ceferri and Spagnolo (2008), 
present smaller impacts than underdeveloped. 
Graph 1: Negative impact of major terrorist attacks on stock markets 
Source: Own elaboration 
Generally speaking, our results show that the impact caused by terrorist attacks on the 
main international capital markets have diminished both in terms of size and duration. 
14
 Nevertheless, this “mildness”, has to be understood in the context of the steadiness or even upward 
trends of international markets when the bombings occurred. 
14
This fits the theory according to which it is the persistence of the terrorist phenomenon 
(and not the singular attack, despite its magnitude) which has a lasting effect on share 
prices, as postulated by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) — in terms of “bad news 
regarding terrorism” — and Eldnor and Melnick (2004) — in terms of real terrorist 
incidents —, the first applied to the Basque Country, the second to Israel, two regions 
which have suffered persistence terrorist violence. Altogether, our results fit — and thus 
at the same time validate — the previous studies by Chen and Siems (2004), Baumert 
(2010) and Kollias et al. (2011) presented above. 
Intraday analysis 
Unlike what happened on 9/11 (when Wall Street did not open until five days later) and 
7/7 (when the UK government controlled the flow of news), the fact that the Boston 
bombings occurred while the US stock markets were operating, allow to study the 
immediate and direct impact of the news flow on the Dow Jones index. This sort of 
study has previously only be done for one major terrorist event: the Madrid bombings 
on 3/11 (see for this Baumert, 2009). 
Contrasting what occurred in Madrid back in 2004, the Boston bombings hit the US 
stock markets on a negative trend. In fact, the Dow Jones that day had already lost more 
than one hundred points when the bombings occurred. Nevertheless, it is also true, that 
the Dow Jones had began to recover a couple of minutes before the attack. And needs to 
be stated, that from that point on — and until the closing of the market approximately 
90 minutes later — it presented an upward, recovering trend, which was only inverted 
every time that additional news regarding the attacks spread. More specifically, there 
are four pieces of news which significantly caused this inversion of the upward trend 
into a negative one, after the bombs exploded on 2:50 pm (see graph 2): 
• 2:57 p.m.: Twitter of Boston Globe reports witnesses hearing “two loud booms”
near the finish line.
• 3:14 p.m.: First video of the scene following the explosion emerges.
• 3:30 p.m.: Reports and images from the scene begin to circulate on social media,
including some graphic photos.
• 3:55 p.m.: Boston Police Department detonate an object near Copley Square in a
controlled explosion.
• 4:02 p.m.: First numbers of dead and injuries, reporting 2 dead and 14 injured.
Thus, it can be affirmed that the news regarding the Boston bombing (spread mainly by 
social media) significantly impacted the Dow Jones, each new piece of information 
reverting the “natural” trend of the index.15 However, one day after the attack, on April 
16, the New York Stock Exchange closed with the Dow Jones having nearly recovered 
all losses of the previous day. 
15
 This shows that in many respects, Twitter has become the latest news wire of Wall Street and that 
investors have come to rely on the social medium for minute-by-minute news and opinion (Witkowski 
and Patel, 2013). 
15
Graph 2: Dow Jones on April 15, 2013 
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
Graph 3: Dow Jones on April 16, 2013 
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
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ARMED TERRORISM VS CYBERTERRORISM 
Financial markets can be seen to be involved in an attack not just as victims, but also as 
instruments. Thus, a recurring question which arises when analysing the stock market 
reaction after large-scale attacks, is the possibility that terrorist groups exploit ‘insider 
information’ about these events not just to finance them, but to obtain large profits from 
them which might be used in maintaining the infrastructure of the organization in 
question (Baumert, 2009, 2010:189-193). It might also enable them to have available 
liquidity, and make the development and execution of future attacks easier.  
Basically, there are three ways by which this sort of ‘terrorist-insider-information’ could 
be used in speculating on a short-term fall in share prices (Baumert, 2010:191). The 
most frequent consists of buying put (sale) options. Another possibility is to make use, 
incurring the payment of commissions, of the loan of shares to sell them at market 
prices (short call or short selling). Finally, a third alternative consist of using the 
forward or future market with total leverage, that is, without any financial outlay on 
signing the contract, except for what is needed to constitute guarantees. These are 
returned once the same contract is settled, and one can position oneself to speculate on a 
fall in prices. 
Although there are no evidences pointing towards this sort of speculation related to the 
Boston bombings — actually, the only asset which presented an “abnormal” loss was 
gold, which dropped -9.3 per cent on the day of the attacks and additional -4 per cent 
the day after (this representing the highest two-day loss since 1988) — suspicious arises 
if we take a look at what occurred just a couple of days later. 
Only eight days after the Boston Bombings shook the world and its financial markets, 
the Associated Press’s (AP) twitter account was hacked. Specifically, on April 23, at 
approximately 12:07 p.m. the AP’s twitter page published one “tweet,” which read: 
This one fake tweet, which could be viewed by the two million people who follow the 
news agency’s twitter account, caused the Dow Jones Industrial Average to drop by -
145 points within minutes of the news (see graph 4).16 To put that into perspective, the 
Dow Jones lost around 265 points on the day of the bombings. And it has to be 
considered that an important part of this loss was reinforced by the fact of the bombings 
a week earlier. Or, in other words, the fake tweet benefited in it verisimilitude from the 
previous, “real” bombings. Simultaneously, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note fell 4 
basis points and the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) lost -0.42 per cent , the so-called fear 
index, spiked 10 per cent. Like one analyst stated, “it actually proves the power of 
16
 Thus evoking the reminiscence of the May 2010 “flash crash”. 
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Twitter, the idea that people take it so seriously that it would move the market. That’s 
pretty impressive.”17 
However, shortly thereafter, the AP’s twitter account was suspended and it was revealed 
that the tweet was fake and the system had been hacked.18 Roughly four minutes after 
the suspension, the Dow Jones promptly returned to its pre-tweet levels, the other 
indices also quickly recovering. This isolated event though brings up some serious 
questions regarding the financial systems and how it reacts to news presented on forums 
like Twitter,19 and how terrorist would be able to use cyberterrorism as a way of 
manipulating the stock markets for a financial profit. 
Graph 4: Drop of the Dow Jones on April 23, 2013 as a result of the faked AP tweet 
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
While by no means is this the first breach of security in a business’s computer system, 
this specific breach at the Associated Press illustrates the need for businesses and 
governments to take the threat of cyberterrorism seriously because of the link 
discovered between news, either real or fake, published on forums like Twitter and the 
subsequent reaction by the stock market.  
17 http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2013/04/23/twitter-hack-market-react-shows-sites-power-says-
wedbush/ 
18
 As Associated Press later admitted, its main Twitter account had been compromised and the attack had 
been preceded by a phishing attempt on AP’s corporate network. 
19
 Witkowski and Patel (2013) quote an interesting statement made by a chief investment officer 
regarding the effect of the fake tweet on the stock market: “It is however a commentary on high 
frequency trading’s ability to demonstrate they are not liquidity providers, and that this market is 
vulnerable to a computer generated turbulence. There were no bids to hit, that makes you question how 
many real buyers, if any, were represented.” 
18
With this information, terrorist groups can now focus their energy on cyberterrorism as 
opposed to “traditional” terrorist weapons because the effects of the former can 
potentially be even worse than those of the latter. It also allows for the possibility for 
terrorist groups to make a profit off of a cyber-attack; similar to speculation that terrorist 
organizations use traditional attacks as a mean of financing (see for this Baumert, 2008). 
While the point drop was not as significant as the day of the bombings, it still clearly 
had a significant effect on the American stock market. In terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis, this cyber-attack clearly presents the better ratio. It has also to be pointed out, 
that this cyber-attack is not an isolated one, but just one more in a series of cyber-
terrorism against US-American financial institutions which started in autumn 2012 
(Baumert, 2012) and had another peak in march 2013  
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of our paper show that the impact of the Boston bombings on the main 
international financial markets indices, namely the Dow Jones, the Ibex, the FTSE, the 
CAC40, the MIB, the DAX and the Nikkei, differ statistically —that is, can be 
considered abnormal— regarding the variations of the 30 trading days before the attack. 
In comparison to previous terrorist events (9/11, 3/11 and 7/7) the markets behaved 
according to the pattern observed in previous studies, that is, presenting a continuous 
and decreasing magnitude and duration in comparison (except, for obvious reasons, for 
the Dow Jones, the only one belonging to a country which has been hit twice by the 
terrorist phenomenon). Also, it can be observed, that the reaction-spread between 
indices has diminished accordingly, pointing either towards a greater correlation 
between markets, a better evaluation of the economic consequences of such attacks by 
financial agents or the fact that the risk of such an attack is being included more 
systemically in share prices. 
It also proves that the news flows — for the first time not traditional media but new 
social media, mainly Twitter — had an immediate and direct impact on the DJ index, 
with each new piece of news negatively reversing the “natural”, recovering trend of the 
New York stock market on that fatidic afternoon. Our study also proves that the cyber-
terrorist attack of April 23, spreading a fake tweet through the AP account, caused an 
immediate and significant impact on the Dow Jones. This gives evidence to the 
vulnerability of the financial system to this sort of cyberterrorism which take advantage 
of security breaches, and which could even be used by terrorist or terrorist-related 
groups to speculate with falling stock prices. It is also points out the possibility that in 
the future these sorts of attacks could be targeted directly towards the financial market´s 
IT system. 
In general terms, our findings fit the results obtained by previous studies, and point 
towards the fact that it is only the persistence of the terrorist phenomenon (and not the 
singular attack, despite its magnitude) which has a lasting effect on share prices, be it 
traditional “armed” terrorism or any new, innovative form of cyberterrorism. 
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